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Abstract: We use a rich dataset of regional government expenditures for 
Japan during the 1990-2000 period to estimate from within-prefecture 
variation   the   multiplier   of   government   investment   and   government 
consumption expenditures. Our main finding is that government spending 
did not have multipliers effects that are on average larger than one. 
Government investment had a positive and significant effect on output that 
was   quantitatively   larger   than   the   effect   of   government   consumption 
expenditures.   Government   personnel   expenditures   and   transfers   to 
households had significant negative output effects while transfers to firms 
produced positive multiplier effects that were significantly larger than one. 
Our findings are consistent with macro model that emphasize the supply-
side effects of fiscal policy during times of financial crisis.
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There is a fierce debate about the effects that government spending has on the economy during 
times of crisis. Both in academic and policy circles are the views split on how effective 
government spending is in resuscitating the economy. Fiscal conservatives warn that the 
unprecedented increases in government spending have led to an unsustainable increase in the 
stock of public debt and caution therefore about the adverse effects that an expansionary fiscal 
stance can have on the economy in the medium to long run.
1 Yet even from a short-run, 
business-cycle perspective is there little consensus among macroeconomists on whether fiscal 
policy is effective in stimulating the economy.
2 Most of the academic debate is theoretical in 
nature, and so far, there exists little evidence from rigorous econometric analysis on the size of 
the government spending multiplier during times of financial crisis.
In this paper we seek to make an empirical contribution to the debate on whether 
government expenditures are effective in stimulating economic activity during times of crisis 
by exploiting a rich dataset of regional government expenditures in Japan during the 1990-
2000 period.  As in the recent crisis of 2008/2009, many elements of the Japanese crisis and 
fiscal stimulus responses share similarities. During the 1990s, a period frequently referred to 
as the "lost decade", economic growth in Japan declined sharply to an average of less than 1 
percent from an average growth rate of 4 percent in the decade earlier. The economic 
slowdown was precipitated by a bursting of the asset bubble as the stock market declined by 
more than 40 percent between 1989 and 1991. In response to the financial distress, monetary 
policy responded with the Bank of Japan lowering the policy rate until hitting the zero lower 
bound. On the fiscal front, the Japanese government introduced numerous stimulus packages 
that were continued over the course of the decade (see Figure 1). 
Our   estimation   strategy   is   based   on   using   the   within-prefecture   variation   in 
government expenditures to estimate regional multiplier effects that government investment 
and government consumption expenditures had on output in Japan during the 1990s. The use 
of regional data allows us to deal with important identification issues of the effects of fiscal 
policy that are related to the non-passiveness of monetary policy. We deal with these issues by 
using panel fixed effects regressions that account for both prefecture-specific unobservables as 
well as time-specific shocks that are common across prefectures in a given year. 
Based on the within-prefecture variation of the data we find that the output multiplier 
of government expenditures is on average not larger than one. For public investment, our fixed 
1 See, for example, Auerbach and Gale (2010).
2 See Hall (2009) and Cogan et al. (2010) for an overview of the literature.
2effects estimates yield an average impact multiplier of 0.79, with a standard error of 0.16. This 
multiplier estimate is highly significantly different from zero, but it is not significantly 
different from one. It is also interesting to note that investment projects that were carried out 
by the city government were more productive than investment projects that were carried out 
by the central government: the multiplier on city government investment projects was 1.03, 
while for prefecture (central) government investment projects it was 0.68 (0.37). Thus, while a 
more detailed analysis that distinguishes public investment by level of administration yields 
that decentralized government investment was more effective in stimulating economic activity 
in   Japan   during   the   90s   than   centralized   government   investment,   the   multiplier   on 
decentralized public investment was on average not significantly larger than one. 
Our second main finding is that different  types  of government spending had very 
different effects on output. Transfers to firms produced an average multiplier of about 2.8, 
followed by public construction that produced an average multiplier of about 1.0. These are 
relatively large multipliers. Statistically the multiplier on transfer to firms is significantly 
larger than one -- a result that is consistent with models that examine the effects of fiscal 
policy when firms face financing constraints, such as e.g. Angeletos and Panousi (2009) or 
Christiano and Ikeda (2010). But our fixed effects analysis also yields multipliers that are 
significantly negative. The multiplier on transfers to households is -3.25 and the multiplier on 
increases in government personnel expenditures is -3.58. Hence, when we look at the average 
effect that total local government expenditures had on output we find a multiplier that is 
positive and significantly different from zero, but not significantly larger than one.
Recent theoretical macro models that focus on the effects of fiscal policy in a constant 
(zero   lower  bound)  monetary  policy  rate  regime  predict  large  multiplier  effects  that, 
depending on parameter values, can exceed one (e.g Woodford, 2010; Eggertson, 2010; 
Christiano et al. 2010). In our estimation framework, a constant interest rate regime is 
certainly an appropriate benchmark case. Yet it is important to note that in Japan during the 
1990s financing constraints were a real issue.
3 The New Keynesian models that predict large 
fiscal multipliers in the presence of a constant monetary policy rate regime assume complete 
financial markets. Such an assumption is unlikely to hold for Japan during the 1990s as asset 
and land prices declined substantially. In a world of incomplete financial markets, where the 
ability of firms to borrow depends on firms' wealth, government spending can have small and 
even negative output effects. This is formally shown in a general equilibrium model by 
3 For empirical evidence that a disruption in the financial system was a major problem in Japan during the 
1990s, see, e.g. Bayoumi (2001), or Woo (2003). For a theoretical model that emphasizes the importance of 
asset (land) prices in affecting firms' ability to obtain finance, see e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
3Angeletos and Panousi (2009). Angeletos and Panousi do not consider an environment where 
the monetary policy rate is constant, but their analysis indicates that in the presence of 
financing constraints the output effects of government spending are much smaller than in a 
model where, for simplicity, financial markets are assumed to be complete. The findings in 
this paper are therefore consistent with macro models that emphasize the supply-side effects 
of fiscal policy in an environment where there is distress in the financial markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 3 provides a background on the fiscal stimulus packages. Section 4 
describes the empirical strategy and the data. Section 5 presents the main empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes.  
2. Related Literature 
There exists a small empirical literature on the multiplier effects of fiscal policy in Japan that 
is predominantly based on country-level data of government expenditures. Estimates for the 
short-run multiplier, derived from VAR models over long time-periods have ranged from 0.4 
(Matsuoka (1996) and Kalra (2003)) to 0.7 (Bayoumi (2001)). Kuttner and Posen (2002) use a 
structural VAR model based on an identification strategy developed in Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) and find a spending multiplier—calculated as the cumulative impact on output after 
four years—of 2.0. 
Several studies have also examined the impact of public investment spending on 
output in Japan. Most of these papers have used the VAR methodology and generally found 
low multiplier effects of public investment spending. Miyazaki (2007) using a structural VAR 
model   finds   that   public   investment   in   construction   have   an   insignificant   impact 
contemporaneously on output, although central government investment has a persistent and 
positive impact over time. Ihori et al. (2003), using non-structural VAR analysis, finds that 
public investment marginally stimulates private consumption in the 1990s, but crowds out 
private investment more so than prior to the 1990s. Afonso and Aubyn (2008) evaluate the 
macroeconomic effects of public and private investment through VAR analysis for 14 
European Union countries, plus Canada, Japan and the United States and find relatively low 
multiplier effects of public investment in Japan. 
Our empirical paper differs from the above mainly in the use of regional data. As we 
will discuss in further detail in Section 4, the use of regional data has several advantages in 
terms of identifying the effects of fiscal policy when monetary policy is non-passive. For the 
US, several recent studies have used state level data to examine the effects of fiscal policy 
4(e.g.   Clemens   and   Miran,   2010;   Fishback   and   Kachanovskaya,   2010;   Nakamura   and 
Steinsson, 2010; Shoag, 2010; Serrato and Wingender, 2010). The time periods and types of 
government spending that these studies analyze differ, and so do their identification and 
estimation strategies. A concise summary of these studies is that they find positive and 
significant multiplier effects that range between 0.6 to 2.2. 
 
3. Background on the Fiscal Stimulus Packages 
The Japanese government introduced numerous fiscal stimulus packages to address the 
economic impact of the financial crisis and the slowdown in growth during the 90s. The key 
components of the packages (about 28 percent of GDP in total), included: 
· public works and social infrastructure related projects, including land acquisition 
(14.2 percent of 2000 GDP); 
· credit guarantees and augmentation of credit lines to banks for loans to small and 
medium-sized enterprises and for the housing sector, (8.5 percent of GDP); 
· employment assistance and cash transfers (2.1 percent of GDP); 
· and tax measures (3.3 percent of GDP).
Appendix 1 provides details of the stimulus packages implemented. Public works projects and 
land acquisition constituted the main component of the stimulus packages in the early part of 
the decade, comprising nearly half of the total stimulus spending. The stimulus packages were 
introduced  through   supplementary  budgets  at  the  level  of  both  the  central  and  local 
governments. A large share of public works programs were financed by local governments in 
the early nineties. However, this share declined over time due to financing difficulties 
experienced by the local governments. Public investment also changed in the second half of 
the nineties away from public works towards other sectors such as science and technology and 
education. Similarly, land purchases by the government, which constituted an important part 
of the stimulus package in the early half of the decade were later abandoned.
Policy loans, including credit guarantees, played a more prominent role later in the 
decade.
4  Cash transfers through employment support, social security spending, and cash 
vouchers for households accounted for a relatively small share of the stimulus package. 
Income tax cuts were first implemented in 1994, with a sunset clause and a VAT increase in 
1997. However, following a sharp economic contraction in 1998, the income tax increase was 
quickly reversed and a series of temporary tax cuts were implemented.
4 The size of the policy loans in the stimulus plans reflect the planned augmentation of credit line by the banks. 
As such, it overstates the budgetary allocation to increase capital of the lending agencies and the underlying 
subsidies. 
5It is important to note that contrary to the headline figures in the announced packages, 
actual fiscal stimulus was limited. The stimulus packages, which were included in the 
supplemental budgets, did not represent the actual fiscal stance because the initial budgets 
were usually contractionary when compared with the outturn in the previous year. Structural 
balances indeed deteriorated from a surplus of about 1/5 percent of GDP in 1990 to a deficit of 
6 percent of GDP in 2000. But the main contributors to the increase in the fiscal deficit were 
declining taxes (3 percentage points) and increases in social security costs (3½ percentage 
points). The remaining 1 percent of GDP was due to government spending on land and capital 
transfers (Kalra, 2003). Public investment increased only between 1990–95 and subsequently 
declined, as concerns about rising public debt led to retrenchment of public spending 
particularly by the local government on self-financed projects. 
4. Estimation Strategy and Data
We use annual time-series data available at the prefecture level during the 1990-2000 period 
to estimate the effect that government expenditures had on regional output. Our dataset 
contains detailed data on the different components of both public investment as well as public 
consumption expenditures for 47 different prefectures. The prefecture level data are from the 
Japan Statistical Yearbook. The Yearbook provides detailed data at the prefecture level on 
government investment that is obtained from the annual report on administrative investment 
from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The public investment data are expenditure based and 
cover   expenditures   on   the  maintenance   and   repair   of   facilities,   improvement   projects 
(including cost of land and compensation), office expenses, and planning and surveys. The 
Yearbook also provides detailed local government finance data on government expenditures 
and government tax revenues from the ordinary accounts of local governments. These data are 
from the annual statistical report on local government finance of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and are based on the reports submitted by the local public bodies. For some summary statistics 
see Table 1.
We use the following econometric model to estimate from within-prefecture variation 
the effect that fiscal policy has on regional output:
(1) Yc,t =φYc,t-1 + ac + dt + p*Gc,t + D
TXc,t + uc,t
where Yc,t is value added of prefecture c in year t and Gc,t are government expenditures of 
prefecture c in year t. Xc,t is a vector of control variables varying at the prefecture-year level; 
ac are unobserved, time-invariant prefecture fixed effects; and dt are year-specific fixed effects. 
6All variables are in real per capita terms and are expressed in logs of the levels.
5 The elasticity 
expenditure multiplier estimate is given by the parameter estimate  p. Following common 
practices in the literature, we obtain and report dY/dG multiplier estimates by multiplying the 
elasticity estimate p with the inverse of the sample average G/Y using the Delta method. 
One of the key advantages of the above model is that it fully accounts for year-specific 
shocks, dt. Accounting for these shocks is important because it allows us to take care of 
identification problems that arise due to the non-passiveness of monetary policy during the 
90s. Because the monetary policy rate is the same across prefectures in a given year it will be 
fully accounted for by the year fixed effects. In contrast to standard VAR analysis, our 
estimates of the impact that fiscal policy has on output will therefore be immune to biases that 
arise due to the inconsistent estimation of the effect that monetary policy has on output. 
Moreover, since the year fixed effects account for the overall size of the announced spending 
packages the fixed effects regressions control for prefecture-wide anticipation effects that are 
associated with the announcement of the fiscal stimuli.
6  
Our estimation framework also allows us to circumvent to a certain extent an 
endogeneity bias that is due to fiscal policy responding to changes in the economic 
environment.   If  government   expenditures  increase  during  times  of  recession,   it could 
introduce negative simultaneity bias between left-hand and right-hand-side variables that 
downward biases the estimates on the fiscal multiplier. Note however that in our estimation 
framework the overall response of government expenditures to recessions is fully accounted 
for by the year fixed effects. For there to be a remaining downward bias it would have to be 
the   case   that   fiscal   policy   is   countercyclical   at   the   prefecture   level.
7  If   government 
expenditures are allocated in a given year randomly across prefectures (conditional on 
prefecture and year fixed effects) then there would be no endogeneity bias.  
To be on the safe side, we also apply system-GMM estimation techniques that treat 
government expenditures as a potentially endogenous regressor. The system-GMM estimator 
uses lagged first-differences of the government expenditure series as instruments for the 
equation in levels. The identifying assumption made in the system-GMM estimation is that, 
5 The main advantage of the log-log specification is that it can be viewed as a first-order approximation of a 
potentially nonlinear (and highly complex) relationship between government spending and output that a linear 
level specification would be ill-suited to capture.
6 The use of annual data, rather than quarterly data where differences in the timing between announced and 
actual spending shocks can be substantial, further reduces the concern that anticipation effects of fiscal policy 
are a major problem. For a discussion of the implications when fiscal shocks are anticipated see e.g. Leeper et 
al. (2008), Mertens and Ravn (2010), or Ramey (2011). 
7 The size of the downward bias can be expected to be relatively small because regional governments faced de 
jure budget constraints: The Local Finance Law restricts ad hoc financing for prefecture governments to 5 
percent of general resources and to 20 percent for municipalities. 
7conditional   on   past   prefecture   output,   past   first-differences   of   prefecture   government 
expenditures are not systematically correlated with contemporaneous changes in prefecture 
output. This condition is satisfied if prefecture governments were to (approximately) base 
their current expenditures on future output forecasts since equation (1) explicitly controls for 
lagged output. Hence, contemporaneous (residual) changes in prefecture output are surprise 
changes that cannot be forecasted by the prefecture governments based on past per capita GDP 
levels.
8 To check on our instrument quality, we report the F-statistic on the significance of the 
first-stage estimates and we also report the standard tests of first and second-order serial 
correlation of the residuals. 
5. Main Results
5.1 Public Investment
Table 2 presents our dynamic panel data estimates of the public investment multiplier that are 
based on data of general public investment expenditures. In column (1) we report least-squares 
estimates where the control variables are prefecture-specific fixed effects only. The estimated 
coefficient on the government investment multiplier is 0.36 and this estimate is  significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. In column (2) we add year fixed effects to account 
for common year shocks, such as changes in the monetary policy rate. This bears the result 
that the least-squares estimate of the public investment multiplier increases slightly to 0.5. 
It is possible that the least-squares estimate suffers from an endogeneity bias. 
Moreover, the presence of prefecture fixed effects in the dynamic panel regression creates a 
bias on the dynamic estimates (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). To address these issues we report in 
column (3) system-GMM estimates where we treat government expenditures as a potentially 
endogenous regressor, instrumenting with the first lag of the difference. The use of the 
system-GMM estimation bears the result that the estimate of the public investment multiplier 
increases to 0.89. The implication of this estimates is that on impact a 1 Yen increase in public 
investment increased output on impact by almost 0.9 Yen on average. Note that since the 
standard error associated with this estimate is 0.16 we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
multiplier estimate reported in column (3) is significantly different from one. The AR(1) 
coefficient on GDP per capita is 0.53 and this implies that the cumulative long-run multiplier 
of a permanent increase in public investment is 1.9 (calculated as 0.89/(1-0.53)). The null 
hypothesis that this cumulative multiplier is equal to one is comfortably rejected at the 1 
percent level with a p-value of 0.004. The first-stage F-statistic on the significance of our 
8 Higher order lags in the prefecture GDP series are not statistically significant. 
8instruments is 26.24 and the p-value on the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in 
the residuals is 0.75. Hence, these test statistics indicate that the GMM estimates are based on 
reasonable instruments.
In column (4) we add tax revenues to the right-hand side of the estimating equation.
9 
This changes the size of the multiplier on public investment little. Interestingly the estimate 
implies a larger multiplier for tax revenues than for public investment. The multiplier on tax 
revenues is -1.25 and the null hypothesis that in absolute size this estimate is larger than the 
estimate on public investment is rejected a the 10 percent level (p-value 0.099). The 
implication of these estimates is that on average a balanced budget increase in public 
investment had a negative multiplier, a result that is echoed by other recent empirical studies 
(see e.g. Barro and Redlick, 2009). 
A relevant policy question that is of particular interest from a public finance point of 
view is whether investment projects carried out by the city and prefecture governments were 
more effective in stimulating economic activity than investment projects carried out by the 
central government. In Table 3 we explore this question by estimating the multiplier effects of 
investment spending by administrative level (central government, prefecture government, city 
government). We find that government investment undertaken by the cities had a multiplier 
that is more than twice as large as the investment multiplier on projects carried out by the 
central government. The impact multiplier on investment projects carried out by the city 
government is approximately 1.0, while the impact multiplier on investment projects carried 
out by the prefecture and central government is 0.7 and 0.4 respectively. 
These estimates suggest that decentralized government investment was more effective 
than centralized government investment in stimulating regional output in Japan during the 90s. 
This could possibly reflect shorter implementation lags in project implementation as spending 
is focused on maintenance of existing projects and better targeting of projects. Moreover, the 
fact that local governments had greater financial constraints particularly as the local (property) 
tax revenues declined sharply, meant that transfers from the central government could be more 
effectively spent. 
5.2 Local Government Expenditures
In Table 4 we repeat the empirical analysis for public expenditures of the local (prefecture-
level) government. Local government spending comprise a significant share of total public 
9 We use cyclically adjusted tax revenues following the procedure outlined in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
We use an elasticity response of tax revenues to GDP of 2 which is based on the tax revenue elasticity 
estimate reported in Nord (2000) for Japan.
9spending. For example, in 1990 public expenditures from the ordinary accounts of the local 
government constituted 65 percent of the net expenditures of the general account of the 
national government and the ordinary account of the local government. Column (1) of Table 3 
presents the estimates of the government expenditure multiplier without distinguishing by type 
of government spending. The control variables (not shown) beyond the prefecture and year 
fixed effects are lagged GDP and tax revenues. The main result from column (1) is that the 
average multiplier on local government expenditures, 0.74, is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level but not significantly larger than one.
Next   we   examine   the   multiplier   effects   of   local   government   expenditures 
distinguishing between the different components of government spending. Our data provides 
us with a breakdown of government expenditures in key areas such as ordinary construction, 
social assistance (subsidy to households), transfers to firms and government personnel. We 
find   that   there   are   substantial   differences   in   the   multiplier   effects   of   these   different 
components of government spending (see columns (2) to (5) of Table 4). Transfers to firms 
produced an average multiplier of about 2.8, followed by public construction that produced an 
average multiplier of about 1.1. These are quite large multipliers, and in fact, the multiplier on 
transfers to firms is significantly larger than one. Nevertheless, some of the other components 
of government expenditures had significant negative output multipliers, such as transfers to 
households (-3.25) and expenditures on government personnel (-3.58). This may explain why 
on average we find a multiplier on overall government expenditures that is not significantly 
larger than one.
10 
In Table 5 we seek to shed further light on the mechanism behind these results by 
reporting estimates of the total employment response (Panel A), the private investment 
response (Panel B) and the private consumption response (Panel C). Consistent with the large 
output multiplier on transfers to firms documented in Table 4, column (2) of Table 5 shows 
that increases in government transfers to firms had a significant positive effect on employment 
and private investment. Although the private consumption response is insignificant, the 
negative point estimate indicates that private consumption decreased in response to increases 
in transfers to firms. Column (3) in turn shows that increases in public construction had a 
significant   positive   effect   on   employment,   an   insignificant   positive   effect   on   private 
investment, and an insignificant negative effect on private consumption. Thus, columns (2) 
and (3) indicate that transfers to firms and construction had significant positive output per 
10 For an empirical study of OECD countries that finds similar adverse effects of government personnel 
expenditures, see for example Alesina et al. (2002). 
10capita effects by significantly increasing employment and, in particular for transfers to firms, 
by significantly increasing private investment.
In contrast to these results, column (4) of Table 5 shows that increases in social 
assistance were associated with a significant decrease in total employment and private 
investment. The decrease in total employment is consistent with increases in social assistance 
representing a positive wealth effect for households that increases the marginal utility from 
leisure, thus reducing the incentives to supply labor. Because the decrease in the supply of 
labor negatively affects the return to capital, private investment decreases. Interestingly, Panel 
C of column (4) shows that increases in social assistance had a positive effect on private 
consumption, although we note that the estimate is associated with a large standard error and 
is not significant at conventional confidence levels. 
From a labor economics point of view it is also interesting to note that column (5) 
shows that increases in government personnel expenditures did not produce significant overall 
increases in employment. We do not have (annual) data that allow us to separate public sector 
salaries from public sector employment and, therefore, are unable pin down this insignificant 
total employment response to increases in public sector employment crowding out (by an 
equal amount) private sector employment.  For example,  increases in public personnel 
expenditures could also be triggered, at least in part, by increases in public sector salaries that 
in   turn   trigger   increases   in   private   sector   salaries   and   hence   decrease   private   sector 
employment (as firms find it more costly to hire workers). Still it is interesting to note that 
private investment significantly decreased in response to increases in government personnel 
expenditures, which suggests that increases in government personnel expenditures were on net 
a burden for the private sector.
5.3 Prefecture Heterogeneity in the Marginal Effect
The reported estimates of the government expenditure multiplier reflect the average marginal 
effect   that   government   expenditures   had   on   output   across   prefectures.   An   important 
econometric issue is whether cross-prefecture parameter heterogeneity leads to an inconsistent 
estimate of this average marginal effect. To check this, we use the mean-group estimator 
developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) that computes estimates prefecture-by-prefecture and 
then takes a linear average of the obtained coefficients. Figure 2 plots the kernel density 
function of the prefecture-specific slope estimates that are obtained from using the lagged 
first-difference of government expenditures as an instrumental variable. The mean (median) 
value of the prefecture-specific slope estimates is 0.48 (0.59). This mean-group estimate is not 
11significantly different from the average marginal effect reported in column (1) of Table 4 that 
is based on the homogeneous panel fixed effects model. We therefore conclude that from an 
econometric point of view cross-prefecture parameter heterogeneity does not lead to an 
inconsistent estimate of the average marginal effect. 
Beyond providing an important robustness check on the average multiplier effect, the 
prefecture-specific slope estimates provide useful information on the extent to which the effect 
of government expenditures on output varied across prefectures. The interquartile range of the 
prefecture-specific multiplier estimates is [-0.14,1.12], with a sample minimum (maximum) of 
-2.39 (2.89). Hence, there is quite a bit of variation in the marginal effect that government 
expenditures had on output across prefectures. 
While this variation in the prefecture-specific multiplier estimates reflects in part the 
statistical uncertainty associated with the estimates, Table 6 shows that these multiplier 
estimates are significantly correlated with prefecture characteristics that, from an economic 
point of view, could drive the cross-prefecture heterogeneity. Column (1) shows that the 
multipliers were significantly higher in prefectures with a higher unemployment rate, although 
this statistical association disappears once regional dummies are included as control variables 
(see column (2)). More robust is the association between the prefecture-specific multipliers 
and GDP per capita: in prefectures with a higher (average) income per capita the multiplier 
was significantly smaller. It is also interesting to note that, consistent with the  model in 
Angeletos and Panousi (2009), the multiplier was significantly lower in prefectures that 
experienced large declines in commercial land prices during the 1990s. Declines in the price 
of commercial land imply a decrease in the asset side of firms' balance sheets. This decrease 
arguably led to a tightening of firms' collateral constraints as the value of collateral against 
which they could borrow decreased. Last but note least, it is worth noting that increases in the 
price of residential land were associated with a lower multiplier. Increases in the price of 
residential land represent a positive wealth effect for households that increases the marginal 
utility of leisure. This positive wealth effect in turn reduces the incentives to supply labor as a 
means of buffering the negative wealth effect associated with increases in government 
expenditures   and   thus   could   interact   in   reducing   the   overall   effect   that   government 
expenditures have on output.
6. Conclusion
How effective was government spending in stimulating economic activity in Japan during the 
crisis of the 1990s? The similarities of the current crisis and the policy response by national 
12governments with the Japanese experience make this an interesting question. We revisit this 
issue and seek to assess the size of the regional multiplier effects of government expenditures 
in Japan using a rich dataset of local public spending. Our first main finding is a significant 
positive government investment multiplier that on average is not significantly larger than one. 
While we find that decentralized government investment was more effective in stimulating the 
economy than centralized government investment, the effects from decentralized government 
investment on output were not significantly larger than one. 
Textbook Keynesian models predict a particularly large output effect of fiscal policy 
when monetary policy has hit the zero lower bound. Our empirical findings may therefore 
appear at first hand somewhat surprising. It is important to remember however that in a 
financial crisis many more things are going on than simply the monetary policy rate 
approaching the zero lower bound. The credit crunch that occurred in Japan during the 90s 
indicates that financial markets were in severe distress. With asset prices decreasing rapidly, 
the value of collateral against which entrepreneurs could borrow to finance their projects 
decreased. As Angeletos and Panousi (2009) show in a model where financial markets are 
incomplete, the output effects of government spending can be substantially dampened because 
the negative wealth effect induced by government spending implies that borrowing constraints 
become more severe. Our first main empirical finding of an average spending multiplier that is 
not significantly larger than one is therefore consistent with general equilibrium models that 
emphasize the supply-side effects of government spending. Our second main finding that the 
multiplier effects on different types of government spending differ substantially is further 
consistent with these supply-side models as we find that transfer to firms had a large output 
multiplier that is significantly larger than one while social assistance and government 
personnel expenditures had significant negative effects on output per capita.
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15Figure 1. Fiscal Balance, Stimulus, and Economic Growth
Figure 2. Distribution of Prefecture-Specific Multipliers
Note: The figure shows the density function of the prefecture-specific multiplier estimates that are obtained by applying the Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) mean-group estimator and instrumenting the government expenditure series with the first lag of the difference. The density 
function is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The mean (median) is 0.48 (0.59).
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Local Government Expenditure Multiplier EstimatesTable 1. Summary Statistics
Share of GDP Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
Total Public Investment 0.121 0.119 0.053 0.209 0.035
     Central Government  0.043 0.039 0.011 0.134 0.019
     Prefecture Government 0.036 0.035 0.009 0.093 0.014
     City Government  0.042 0.041 0.007 0.077 0.010
Total Local Government 
Expenditures 
0.137 0.133 0.056 0.296 0.049
     Construction 0.047 0.047 0.009 0.129 0.022
     Personnel 0.039 0.037 0.019 0.066 0.011
     Transfer Firms 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.027 0.003
     Transfer Households 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.012 0.002
Table 2. The Government Investment Multiplier
(1) (2) (3) (4)





















AR(1) Test, p-value . . 0.00 0.00
AR(2) Test, p-value . . 0.75 0.58
First-Stage F-Statistic . . 26.24 29.24
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1) and (2) is least squares, columns (3) and (4) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 
1998). T-values (shown in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the prefecture level. 
Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 percent confidence 
level. 
17Table 3. Estimates of the Government Investment Multiplier 
by Administrative Level
  (1) (2) (3)





AR(1) Test, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) Test, p-value 0.63 0.63 0.63
First-Stage F-Stat 52.51 39.39 40.10
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470
Note: The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The regression controls for lagged GDP and tax 
revenues (estimates not shown). T-values (shown in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered 
at the prefecture level. *Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 
percent confidence level. 
Table 4. Estimates of the Local Government Expenditures Multiplier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Local Gov. 
Expenditures
 Transfers to 














AR(1) Test, p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) Test, p-value 0.21 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
First-Stage F-Statistic 11.25 48.47 44.43 41.40 9.65
Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470 470
Note: The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The regression controls for lagged GDP and tax 
revenues (estimates not shown).  T-values (shown in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered 
at the prefecture level. *Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence level, *** 99 
percent confidence level.
18Table 5. Response of Employment, Private Investment and Consumption
Panel A: Total Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Government 
Expenditures
 Transfers to 
















Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470 470
Panel B: Private Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Government 
Expenditures
 Transfers to 
















Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470 470
Panel C: Private Consumption
All Government 
Expenditures
 Transfers to 
















Prefecture FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470 470
Note: The method of estimation is system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The dependent variable in Panel A is total 
employment; Panel B private investment; Panel C private consumption. All regressions control for the lagged dependent variable 
and tax revenues (estimates not shown).  T-values (shown in parentheses) are based on Huber robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the prefecture level. *Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent confidence 
level, *** 99 percent confidence level.
19Table 6. Relationship Between Prefecture-Specific Multiplier Estimates and 
Prefecture Characteristics 

























Regional Dummies No Yes
R-Squared 0.197 0.502
Observations 47 47
Note: The method of estimation is least-squares. The dependent variable is the prefecture-specific multiplier estimates that are 
obtained from a mean-group regression (Pesaran and Smith, 1997) where the dependent variable is prefecture GDP per capita 
and the coefficient on the local government expenditures per capita explanatory variable varies across prefectures. Reported t-
values are based on Huber robust standard errors. The eight regional dummy indicators are for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, 
Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu. *Significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level, ** 95 percent 
confidence level, *** 99 percent confidence level.
20Appendix I. Fiscal Stimulus Package in Japan since 1990s
Source: Nakagawa (2009).
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Table   Fiscal stimulus packages in Japan since 1990s
(JPY trillion)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15














































Tax cut 0.2 5.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.6 6.0 22.6
      Ad hoc personal income tax cut 5.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 15.5
      Permanent tax cut in personal and corporate income tax 6.0 6.0
      Other tax cuts included in the stimulus package 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.1
Cash transfer to households 0.7 2.0 2.7
Government investments (Ig) to build up social infrastructure 6.3 7.2 2.0 3.7 5.4 9.1 7.7 8.1 6.8 5.2 4.2 3.4 1.9 2.2 73.1
Public works involving central government 4.5 5.6 1.5 3.4 6.7 1.6 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.6 1.0 38.2
Public works by local governments 1.8 1.6 0.5 0.3 1.0 1.5 6.7
Science and technology 0.3 1 1.1 1.2 1 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 6.4
Education and social welfare 1 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.7 5.1
Alternative energy and environment 1.6 1 0.6 0.6 3.8
Natural disaster relief 5.1 1.4 1 1.3 1.6 0.5 1.7 0.4 13.0
Other government measures for; 4.5 5.8 4.0 5.7 1.5 5.2 4.4 9.1 11.3 5.8 5.8 0.0 11.8 9.6 22.7 107.1
      Acquisition of land for public use 1.6 1.6 0.3 2.3 3.2 1.1 10.1
      Employment support 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.3 5.9
      Expansion of policy lending for housing sector 0.8 1.8 2.9 1.2 0.5 1.2 2 10.4
  Expansion of policy lending and government guarantees
          for non-financial sector (small and medium size businesses) 1.2 1.9 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 2.0 5.9 7.4 4.5 4.5 10.9 9.1 21.8 74.2
     Others 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.1 1.2 1 0.9 0.5 0.6 6.5
Total size of stimulus package 10.8 13.2 5.9 15.2 2.0 7.0 14.2 2.0 2.0 16.7 23.9 18.1 11.0 5.8 4.2 15.2 11.5 26.9 205.5
      Total size/ GDP (%) 2.2 2.7 1.2 3.1 1.4 2.9 3.3 4.7 3.6 2.2 1.2 0.9 3.1 2.2 5.1 2.3
(avarage)
of which (Ig + Tax cuts + Cash transfer) 6.3 7.4 2.0 9.6 2.0 5.4 9.1 2.0 2.0 12.3 14.8 6.8 5.2 0.0 4.2 3.4 1.9 4.2 98.4
 (Ig+Tax cuts+Cash transfer) / GDP (%) 1.3 1.5 0.4 2.0 0.4 1.1 1.8 0.4 0.4 2.4 2.9 1.4 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.8 1.1
(avarage)
Nominal GDP 483.8 480.7 480.7 487.0 496.5 496.5 496.5 508.4 513.3 503.3 503.3 499.5 504.1 493.6 493.6 489.9 526.9 526.9
Central government bond issuance in supplementary budgets  2.3 2.2 3.6 2.2 2.8 4.7 6.1 12.3 7.6 2.0 1.7 0.0 5.0 0.4 n.a. 52.9
Note 1) There was an economic package in June 1999 to boost employment by 700 thousand jobs by deregulations and so on, involving almost no additional budgetary outlays. Therefore, this package is not listed in the table.  
Note 2) Nominal GDP for 2008 is an estimation by the Japanese government.  